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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to present a case for institutional equity investment in
brownfields in the urban core of major metropolitan areas. Pension plans and university
endowments are the primary institutional investors focused on in the study, due to the
implied obligation to seek economic and social returns associated with their investments.
The thesis will discuss primary forces that have historically limited institutional
investment in brownfields in urban core communities as well as recent demographic and
market trends in brownfield redevelopment and institutional equity investment in real
estate. The thesis will include an analysis of two case studies, and implications for future
trends in institutional equity investment in underserved communities in the urban core of
major metropolitan areas.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Institutional investors represent powerful players in the real estate equity market. Pension
plans were estimated to own about $148.7 billion, or 36.9%, of the real estate equity
market in 2002 (Fickes, 2003). In 2003, pension plan investors are expected to channel
about $14 billion to the U.S. real estate equity market (Fickes, 2003). Institutional
investment flows have influenced the pace, location, and extent of real estate equity
investment in the United States. This has had a significant influence on the pattern of real
estate equity investment within the national real estate market. Growing suburban
markets benefited from institutional capital flows between the 1970s and 1990s, while
many communities in the urban core suffered from the combined, and related, effects of
the preponderance of brownfield sites and the "lack of institutional capital" directed at
infill sites (Gordon, 2002). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines
brownfield sites as "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may
be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant,
or contaminant" (EPA, 2003). Based on the U.S. EPA's estimate of the total number of
brownfield sites, the projection of the number of opportunities appropriate for
institutional equity investment is approximately 10% (Gerst, 2002).
Institutional interest in real estate equity dates to the early 1970s. Initially, institutional
equity investment in real estate arose from the need to find investment vehicles that
would offer better performance than the stock market, which lost 40% of its value
between 1973 and 1974, as well as the bond market, which suffered significant losses
during the 1970s due to unexpected inflation (Winograd, 2001). For pension plan
management, the passage of The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) was a formal endorsement of asset diversification (Black, 1997). Since then,
while the allocations of pension plan portfolios have fluctuated significantly, real estate
has been generally recognized as a separate asset class and perceived as having a
significant role in reducing the risk of the mixed-asset portfolio. Since the 1980s, the
paucity of institutional equity investment in brownfields projects has contributed to the
lack of private real estate investment in urban core locations, which tend to have a
relatively high number of brownfield sites due to historic industrial and manufacturing
uses.
Public pension plans and university endowments, particularly those that are large and
have the capital and capacity to pursue such opportunities on a cost-effective basis, are
well positioned to seek urban infill investments, which can offer higher risk-adjusted
returns. Sponsors of pension plans and university endowments have a fiduciary
responsibility to seek investment opportunities that will satisfy the minimum required
returns necessary to meet beneficiary payment obligations. However, recent attention has
been given to the idea of an implicit secondary obligation of public pension funds to
make "affordable housing and urban infill investments, as long as it is prudent" (Gordon,
2002).
Given the preponderance of brownfields within the urban core of many of our nation's
major metropolitan areas, the implicit obligation of university and college endowments
that are based in center city locations is compelling. According to a joint study by the
Initiative for a Competitive Inner City (ICIC) and CEOs for Cities, the number of college
and university institutions located in the urban core nationwide is estimated at 1,902
(ICIC et. al., 2002). Higher education institutions at the urban fringe number 914 and
those that are in non-urban locations number 933 (ICIC et. al., 2002). Higher education
institutions hold "vast amounts of real estate," with the 1996 value of the original
purchase price of land and buildings held by the urban core institutions priced at $100
billion (ICIC et. al., 2002).
As the joint study stated, many of the nation's higher education institutions are "located
in or near poor urban areas," and "the futures of institutions of higher education are
inexorably tied to the health of their communities" (ICIC et. al., 2002). To the extent that
university endowments contribute to the revitalization and continued economic vitality of
the urban infill communities by investing in prudent, market return real estate equity
projects that meet the needs of the surrounding community, there will be the opportunity
for an alignment of interests between and shared economic benefits for the community
and the endowment funds.
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. After this introduction, the second chapter
presents a case for pension plan and university endowment equity investment in
brownfields in urban core locations. The third chapter reviews historical barriers to such
investment, and includes a discussion of issues that are particular to pension plan and
university endowment sponsors. The fourth chapter discusses recent trends in
institutional investment in urban brownfields. The fifth chapter presents the case study
methodology and the following chapter presents the case studies. The seventh chapter is
an analysis of the case studies to ascertain how historical barriers to institutional
investment in brownfields in urban core locations were managed as well as the expected
economic benefits of those investments. The final chapter concludes by reflecting on
what the implications may be for communities of color and opportunities to engage
institutional capital for projects that benefit the community and the equity investor.
Chapter II: The Case for Pension Plan and University Endowment Investment in
Brownfields in Urban Core Locations in Major Metropolitan Areas
Urban brownfields opportunities can represent an attractive investment for pension plans
and university endowments. Urban brownfields can offer the traditional benefits of real
estate equity investment, such as current income and appreciation returns, inflation
hedging, and asset and liability matching. In addition, urban brownfields represent the
kind of higher risk-adjusted return opportunities, those that involve the development or
"transformation" of a property, that are well suited for investors like pension plans and
endowments due to their portfolio diversification goals and investment time frame
(Lindahl, 2002).
Demographic and investment trends that dominated the real estate market over the last
thirty years appear to have resulted in market inefficiencies, in terms of acquisition
pricing and institutional capital flow, in particular communities and locations in urban
core locations. The population growth and improved economic conditions of many urban
core communities over the last ten years have resulted in pent-up demand for retail and
housing uses. While market norms for environmental tolerance amongst institutional
investors have changed significantly over the last ten to fifteen years in response to
changes in the regulatory framework, improvements in remediation technology, and
increases in the availability and pricing of environmental insurance products, there is still
limited institutional competition for brownfield redevelopment projects in the urban core
of major U.S. cities.
Underserved Markets in Urban Core Communities
Institutional capital contributed to the commercial and residential growth of the nation's
suburbs through the 1990s. At the same time, institutional investors, including the real
estate advisory community, continued to "largely overlook" real estate equity projects in
urban infill locations despite the existence of "attractive investment opportunities"
(Gordon, 2002). Demographic changes in the 1970s and environmental policy changes in
the 1980s had a significant influence over real estate development in urban infill
communities. It is generally accepted that the nation's brownfields tend to be located in
cities within or around the urban core that had historic concentrations of heavy
manufacturing and industrial uses (Sheridan, 1996). Between 1970 and 1990, increases in
zones of concentrated poverty in central city locations "contributed to a general process
of population deconcentration" in America's major metropolitan areas (Jargowsky,
2003). This resulted in "donut cities," where "depopulating and impoverished urban
cores" were "surrounded by prosperous and growing suburbs" (Jargowsky, 2003).
Institutional capital was channeled towards the growing suburbs and "greenfield" sites at
the urban fringe, resulting in a lack of institutional capital available for projects,
particularly brownfields, that were located in the urban core.
However, the economic growth of the 1990s resulted in significant demographic changes
in the nation's urban core that have meaningful implications for institutional real estate
equity investors. The results of the 2000 U.S. Census suggest that communities of the
urban core benefited significantly from the economic boom of the 1990s, both in terms of
population growth and reductions in areas of concentrated poverty (Jargowsky, 2003).
Central cities, which experienced a 21% decline, were major beneficiaries of the 24%
overall drop in the number of people living in high-poverty neighborhoods in the nation,
with the steepest declines occurring in the Midwest and South regions (Jargowsky, 2003).
Over the same decade, "the vast majority of central cities registered population gains,"
with population growth and immigration increases representing the "biggest contributors
to the growth and stability of older central cities" during that time (Lachman and Brett,
2002).
In some cases, the population growth and limited real estate investment that characterized
urban communities in infill locations has resulted in underserved markets, where pent-up
demand and limited competition could translate into opportunities for higher risk-
adjusted returns. As Lachman and Brett (2002) put it, "all central cities- whether
growing or declining - must serve the housing, working, shopping, and recreational
needs of an increasingly diverse population." While average household income levels for
urban core communities may, at first glance, lead developers to bypass such communities
for retail development, the higher density levels associated with urban core
neighborhoods can translate into overall purchasing power that is competitive with lower
density communities in suburban areas that may have higher average household income
levels. The extent to which the needs of the populations in central cities have not been
met represents the opportunity for institutional investors to invest in viable real estate
projects that can offer market returns.
These types of urban infill projects can also represent attractive real estate investments
because they tend to benefit from the positive attributes of major urban centers. "Access
to large and diverse labor markets, sophisticated sources of financing, and local
governments motivated to act as partners rather than regulators" are attributes that can
characterize such urban communities (Platt, 1998). They tend to be well located in terms
of access to public transportation and highway access, and well served in terms of access
to public infrastructure (Platt, 1998). Since many of the real estate equity investors in
urban infill projects are local and regional players, investments in brownfields in urban
core locations represent real estate equity opportunities in projects where there is limited
institutional competition, despite their location in major metropolitan areas (Gordon,
2002). Due to the environmental remediation component of the projects, combined with
negative perceptions of urban core locations, the limited institutional activity in urban
brownfields in the urban core of major metropolitan areas may have resulted in market
inefficiencies that could translate into substantial opportunities for discounted acquisition
pricing and an overall superior risk-adjusted return.
Inflation Hedge
As real estate investments, urban brownfield investments would contribute to the
traditional role of real estate as a tool to hedge inflation within the mixed-asset
institutional portfolio. The cash flows associated with real estate rents tend to keep pace
with inflation, while investment alternatives, such as stocks and bonds, tend to decline in
value due to inflation shocks. The inflation shocks experienced during the 1970s and
1980s negatively impacted the returns on stock and bond returns relative to real estate
(Black, 1997). The cash flow returns associated with real estate generally kept pace with
increases in the overall price level. By the mid-1980s, it had become widely accepted
amongst institutional investors that "optimal risk-return performance dictated an
investment of 10 percent of total assets in income real estate" (Black, 1997). Although
the 10% allocation dropped dramatically in the aftermath of the liquidity crisis of the late
1980s and early 1990s, the inclusion of income-producing real estate equity investment in
mixed asset pension plan portfolios had become increasingly common (Winograd, 2001).
To the extent that there is positive cash flow associated with a particular brownfield
project, it should offer the same inflation hedging function as traditional real estate equity
investments.
Asset-Liability Matching
Pension plans face a fiduciary responsibility to seek investments that will enable their
portfolios to fund obligations to their beneficiary populations. University and college
endowment sponsors face similar minimum return thresholds to enable them to support
ongoing programs associated with their respective universities and colleges. The income
return component of fixed income and real estate equity investments can offer attractive
opportunities to meet those cash flow obligations. However, of the two asset class
alternatives, only real estate equity investment offers the opportunity to realize high
annual yields and long-term capital appreciation (Lindahl, 2002). To the extent that
pension plans and university endowments have beneficiary populations that live in the
U.S., their funding liabilities are dollar denominated. From an asset-liability matching
standpoint, those plans and endowment funds are well served to have a significant
allocation of assets that are located in the same country in which the liabilities are located
(AIG, 2001). Urban brownfields enhance the ability of these investors to invest in higher
risk adjusted return opportunities that offer a cash flow stream that is denominated in the
same currency as that which dominates the country in which many of their beneficiaries
live.
Enhance Real Estate Cycle Strategy
The longer investment horizon of pension plan and university endowment funds
contributes to their ability to respond to changes in market conditions. Since the real
estate market is cyclic, the longer investment horizon is a competitive advantage enjoyed
by many institutional real estate equity investors relative to other investors that may have
stricter timing restraints on their investment activity. Real estate cycles have "pervasive
and dynamic impacts on real estate returns, risks, and investment values," which
significantly affect the viability of real estate investments (Pyhrr et. al., 1999). A recent
study of real estate cycles revealed that for investors that "have multiple capabilities,
pursuing different types of involvements in multiple real estate investment markets," "the
reality of [real estate] cycles offers the opportunity to have certain parts of their business
perform better in certain market conditions than in other market conditions" (Pyhrr et. al.,
1999). This would enable those investors to "have the capability to shift their mix and
emphasis over time" and "enjoy superior results over those who do not" (Pyhrr et. al.,
1999).
In response to movements within the real estate cycle, institutional investors may change
their real estate portfolio strategy, such as increasing their emphasis on "buying troubled
existing properties, land investment, and development opportunities" as "markets move
from very weak (trough of cycle) to strengthening (recovery) to strongest (expansion)
levels" (Pyhrr et. al., 1999). Urban brownfields in infill locations should have a place
within this framework, amongst other higher risk/higher return investment opportunities.
The inclusion of urban brownfields in urban core locations would expand the "universe"
of real estate equity investment opportunities as institutional investors seek to implement
opportunistic strategies within the domestic market that target projects offering higher
risk adjusted returns in response to market conditions.
Chapter III: Historical Barriers to Institutional Investment in Brownfields
Multiple factors have contributed to the historical lack of institutional investment in
brownfields. Liability and financial risks have been particularly influential in deterring
"deep pocket" investors such as pension plans and university endowments from investing
in brownfields. In addition, there is a relatively longer period necessary to close
brownfield transactions and realize expected cash flow returns. For urban brownfield
located in older cities, such as those that dot the Northeast and Midwest landscape, there
is often a rather complicated zoning approval process that increases the entitlement risk
typically associated with a real estate transaction. For institutional investors such as
pension plans and university endowments, there is also the newspaper risk associated
with a highly publicized environmental scandal. However, recent developments in the
brownfield market, whether from an insurance or regulatory perspective, have resulted in
dramatic changes that should significantly influence institutional investment decision-
making with respect to brownfields.
Longer Period to Close Transaction & Realize Returns
Brownfields transactions tend to be more complicated on average than typical real estate
projects. There is a longer time period associated with closing the deal, which often
includes capital outlays to fund overhead expenditures. According to Tom Darden of
Cherokee Investment Partners, the average time to close on a typical brownfields
transaction is twelve months, but can extend to as long as three years (Darden, 2003). In
addition, there is, on average, a longer period before investors realize income returns due
to the remediation period associated with brownfields. The remediation period varies
based on the extent of contamination and proposed use of the site. While improvements
in remediation technology over the last ten years have enhanced the ability to estimate the
timing and extent of environmental contamination, brownfield deals continue to tend to
be very complex, time-intensive transactions.
Regulatory Process & Entitlement Risk
Traditional real estate development projects entail some degree of entitlement risk. With
urban infill projects, the entitlement risk component of a project may be intensified due to
the complex approval process of many urban municipalities. Generally, urban infill
projects tend to involve the navigation of a more demanding, restrictive, and costly
regulatory framework versus projects in newly developing areas (Suchman et al, 1997).
Many infill parcels are zoned for uses that are not economically viable, which
necessitates the pursuit of approval for rezoning (Suchman et al, 1997). The lack of clear
guidance from the federal and state agencies regarding cleanup standards and liability
limits during the 1980s and into the 1990s resulted in turning away many would-be
developers of urban infill projects that would be economically viable once remediated.
Without a municipal commitment to facilitating the redevelopment of urban infill
projects, or in cases where the city does not have the resources to do so, the relatively
more complicated regulatory process and entitlement risk associated with urban infill,
combined with the liability and financial risk components of brownfield redevelopment,
led many would-be developers of urban brownfields to "opt out" (Suchman, 2002).
Fortunately, there is evidence that more urban municipalities are adjusting their
traditionally more restrictive stance in an effort to help facilitate redevelopment,
particularly in urban core communities that have suffered from a lack of private
investment. Successful urban infill development often involves a partnership between the
city government and the developer. City support can take a range of forms, from financial
form, such as enabling the developer to cap environmental exposure, to informational,
such as taking an active role in assisting developers with the navigation of the regulatory
framework, which can be particularly complex with brownfield projects. Public-private
partnerships for brownfield redevelopment can result in an alignment of interests between
the community and the developer, such that the community benefits from the potential for
the environmental cleanup and redevelopment of an underutilized or abandoned site,
while the developer benefits from the potential to earn higher risk-adjusted returns on a
real estate investment.
Liability & Financial Risk
The impact of changes in public policy during the 1980s, notably the enactment of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
in 1980, resulted in a shift of capital away from investment in real estate that had been or
was perceived to be environmentally contaminated. Under CERCLA (also referred to as
"Superfund"), any owner or operator of a site where hazardous substances had been
released was made liable for the costs of the environmental cleanup (Platt, 1998). In two
seminal cases during the 1980s, U.S. v. Chem Dyne (572 F. Supp. 802 805-810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983)) and U.S. v. Monsanto (858 F. 2d 160 (4th Circuit 1988)), the law was
interpreted "to impose 'joint and several liability"' on owners and operators of
environmentally contaminated sites (Platt, 1998). The liability was retroactive, and meant
that any owner or operator that was responsible for causing any part of the contamination
was liable for the entire cleanup cost, including new owners that may not have
contributed to the contamination at all (Platt, 1998). If the owner of a contaminated site
was sued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the sole recourse of the
owner beyond its own pockets would be to sue past owners or users of the site in order to
recover their "contribution" to the cleanup costs (Platt, 1998).
The risk of being in the chain of title for environmentally contaminated properties was
particularly powerful in motivating "deep pocket" investors like pension plans and
university endowments to avoid those types of investments. These investors were
unwilling to invest in projects where the risk of loss exceeded the amount of the capital
invested. At that time, specialized insurance products such as environmental insurance
were of limited availability and cost prohibitive. Indeed, the tools to reasonably estimate
the extent of contamination, and the timing and costs associated with remediation, were
limited. The aftermath of CERCLA legislation in the 1980s and early 1990s was a
tendency towards a "zero tolerance" approach for environmental contamination by many
institutional investors in real estate.
Given the risk issues discussed above, the availability of environmental insurance has
been a key factor in limiting institutional investment in brownfields. Technological
improvements over the last decade as well as the benefit of accumulating experiences
associated with brownfields redevelopment resulted in significant improvements in the
ability to accurately estimate the time and cost associated with environmental
remediation (Bruder, 1999).
"Cost-cap" or "stop-loss" insurance products allow brownfield redevelopers to insure
against cleanup costs over and above a predetermined cost estimate plus the deductible
(Whitman, 2001). The cost estimate is based on the results of the environmental
investigation performed on the property as well as the remediation action plan necessary
to meet state environmental standards (Whitman, 2001). The cost cap insurance covers
brownfields investors for known environmental contaminants on the property or adjacent
properties, as well as ordinary cost overruns associated with the remediation (Leon,
2003). This type of coverage typically sets a maximum exposure for mitigation expense
by offering up to 200% of the remediation costs as estimated in the initial remediation
plan (Meyer and Lyons, 2000). Cost cap insurance projects are typically acquired for
projects with remediation costs expected to exceed about $1.0 million, and tend to be too
expensive for smaller remediation budgets (Dragat, 2003).
Pollution legal liability insurance indemnifies the brownfields investor against liability
for the preexisting conditions at the site (Busby, 2003). The cost of pollution legal
liability policies are typically a small proportion of the overall value of the transaction
(Busby, 2003). Broader coverage is also available to cover claims for "ecosystem
damage, health problems encountered by neighbors or workers, and loss of property
value by nearby owners" (Meyer and Lyons, 2000). The availability of this type of
insurance product at competitive pricing levels should go far towards enabling
institutional investors to obtain a level of comfort with investing in brownfields that are
further along the risk spectrum for environmental contamination, where the timing and
extent of remediation is less quantifiable.
Prospective liability and "reopener" coverage offers insurance against future liabilities
associated with changes in government regulations concerning environmental cleanup as
well as "claims for damage due to contaminants remaining in place during the course of
redevelopment" (Meyer and Lyons, 2000). Recent research reveals that the reopener rate
in the U.S. is quite low, estimated at 0.1%, which was considered to be a "very modest
level of concern" and indicated that reopeners are "a manageable risk in the brownfields
arena" (Simons et. al., 2003).
However, the availability and pricing of such products are affected by market conditions.
In the early 2000s, the environmental insurance market tightened (Lynott,2003). The
tightening is believed to be part of an overall market correction associated with poor
underwriting and the rise of cost cap claims (McGovern, 2003). Turnover amongst the
environmental insurance carriers included United National, which closed its
environmental insurance operation (Lynott, 2003). Environmental insurance policies
became "more expensive and harder to get," with the transaction costs for negotiating
insurance, particularly for smaller scale brownfield projects, becoming a significant issue
for would-be brownfield developers (Meyer, 2003). However, the pollution liability
insurance products did not experienced the same cost increases to the same extent as the
cost cap insurance products. (McGovern, 2003).
The use of risk-based standards for environmental cleanup has resulted in cleanup
thresholds appropriate to the intended redevelopment use for the site, and has been a
significant force in reducing environmental cleanup costs overall. These standards have
been developed for petroleum contamination as well as chemical contamination
(Whitman, 2001). Although risk-based standards may involve a relatively higher cost and
longer time frame associated with the more extensive site investigation and risk
assessment, their use may result in lower clean-up requirements associated with a
particular use (Whitman, 2001). Furthermore, institutional controls, which may include
deed notices, deed restrictions, and ground water use restrictions, help to ensure that
future owners and users of the site are aware of the potential hazards that may exist
(Whitman, 2001). Institutional controls are mechanisms that are intended to limit
"exposure to residual contamination" at projects for which remediation has been
performed (McTiernan, 2002).
Changes in the environmental insurance market have dramatically altered the availability
of tools to help mitigate the risks involved with brownfields acquisitions. The broader
availability and competitive pricing of environmental insurance projects has enabled
institutional investors to appropriately mitigate liability and financial risk concerns that
had been significant factors in keeping institutional investors out of the brownfields
market over the last twenty years. This has positive implications for improvements in the
availability of institutional capital for brownfields projects.
Changes in Public Policy
Changes in environmental policy also bode well for increases in institutional activity in
brownfield projects. Recent legislation signaled a "less threatening" stance by the federal
government towards brownfield redevelopment (Abelson, 2003). As discussed above, the
impact of the 1980 CERCLA legislation was particularly powerful in diverting
institutional capital away from brownfields investment. An amendment to the legislation
in 1986, the "innocent owner" defense, was intended to release real estate investors from
liability if "all reasonable inquiry" was performed on the property prior to purchase
(Leon, 2003). However, the amendment was "toothless," because the law was too vague
regarding the standard for inquiry, such that if undetected contamination was discovered,
then "all reasonable inquiry" could be interpreted as not having been performed (Leon,
2003).
In an attempt to implement "smart growth" strategies, many cities and states have begun
to focus on ways to restrict the development of farmland and other open spaces (Stann
and Airst, 1999). The focus on smart growth has resulted in more attention on how state
and city governments can help to facilitate infill development, including urban core
brownfields. Many states took action to provide some liability relief to potential
brownfields developers during the 1990s. State environmental voluntary cleanup
programs (VCPs) issued closure letters such as no further action (NFA) letters and
certificates of completion (COCs) that formally acknowledged the "end of the site
remediation regulatory process" but left open the possibility of being "reopened" in
certain circumstances (Simons et. al., 2003). Reopeners are also typically appended to
Covenant Not to Sue (CNS) documentation, which provide "assurances that, in return for
meeting specified standards for cleanup, the state will not sue for further cleanup on the
site" (Yount, 1999). The reopening of a site after the completion of the redevelopment
could compromise the tenants as well as the equity and debt capital committed to the
project (Simons et. al., 2003). The possibility of a project being reopened, as well as the
continued risk of enforcement of stringent federal remediation standards and liability
risks under federal law (CERCLA) continued to contribute to the perceived liability and
financial risk associated with brownfield redevelopment. As of March 2002, the federal
EPA had entered into a state memorandum of agreement (SMOA) with 18 states, which
offered protection from legal action by the U.S. EPA against a site in those states
(Simons et. al., 2003).
The major nod from the federal government towards brownfield redevelopment came in
2001, when Congress passed the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act. In contrast to the effects of the 1986 CERCLA amendment, the new
law required that the EPA establish standards for "appropriate inquiry" that would be
sufficient to obtain liability relief (Bourdeau, 2002). Until those new standards are
established, the Phase I assessment procedures as established by the American Society
for Testing and Materials (ASTM) is the recognized standard (Bourdeau, 2002). Under
the new law, even if the brownfields investor satisfies the conditions necessary for relief
under the "innocent owner" liability protection during the acquisition phase, there may be
continuing obligations required to be undertaken in order to preserve the protection"
(Keyes, 2002). The ongoing obligations may include "complying with information
requests, providing access to persons authorized to undertake cleanup" and compliance
with land use restrictions and institutional controls (Keyes, 2002).
The new law signaled a change in the approach of the federal government towards new
buyers and potential redevelopers of brownfields that had not contributed to the
environmental contamination of the sites being acquired. The 2001 change in
environmental law offers substantial relief from the liability risks that characterized
brownfield investment in the 1980s and 1990s. The new federal policy and
implementation of institutional controls and risk-based remediation at the state level, in
conjunction with dramatically improved technology and expertise available to estimating
the timing and extent of remediation associated with a given brownfield project, as well
as the availability of competitively priced environmental insurance policies all bode well
for increased equity participation in brownfields investments by institutional investors.
Newspaper Risk
In addition to the risk factors discussed above, pension plans and university endowments
face "newspaper" or "stigma" risk, which here refers to the risk that a pension plan or
university endowment has of being associated with a highly publicized scandal associated
with a particular investment. An interview with James Gasperoni of Princeton University
(2003) indicated that this was an issue that pension plans and university endowments
considered a meaningful concern. While there have been some efforts to quantify
newspaper risk in terms of a particular basis point spread, the results were inconclusive
(Gasperoni, 2003).
However, it is generally accepted that pension plans and university endowments as a
group are influential players in the capital markets, and large institutions have sometimes
taken a leadership role in the investment community. For example, a March 2003
CalPERS press release revealed that a cross-section of institutional investors (including
state treasurers and labor unions) with $3 billion in total investment assets, joined in a bi-
coastal news conference and took out a full-page ad in the Wall Street Journal the
previous month (CalPERS, 2003). In the news conference and Wall Street Journal ad, the
investors called on expatriate U.S. corporations to "Come Home to America" from their
offshore tax havens (CalPERS, 2003). With such a powerful position within the
investment community and a fiduciary commitment to their fund beneficiaries, pension
plan and university endowment leadership would seriously consider the newspaper risk
component of any investment and expect to be compensated for that additional risk. An
interview with a CEO of a previously active brownfields development group that was
quoted in an industry newsletter revealed that "the perception of boards being tagged to a
contaminated site is still problematic" for obtaining institutional capital for brownfields
projects (Gerst, 2002). The CEO said that "there is still the perception that one day their
names will appear on the front page of the paper talking about a contaminated site"
(Gerst, 2002).
Institutional Capital Flows Towards Higher-Risk Real Estate Investments Are Cyclical'
According to the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF)
Portfolio Management Committee Investment Styles Definitions draft White Paper
(Baczewski et al, 2003), three real estate investment strategies dominate institutional
investment: core, value-added, and opportunistic. Core investments are characterized by
stable current income and low to moderate level of risk. According to the NCREIF Styles
White Paper (2003), the income component of the total return will dominate the
appreciation component, and target total returns are typically in the range of 10% to 12%
per year and expected to reflect the same trends as the NCREIF Property Index.
In contrast, the appreciation component typically dominates the total return for value-
added investments, although the income return is generally expected to contribute to the
total return. NCREIF classifies value-added properties as typically having a moderate
level of risk and higher expected returns (about a 200 basis point estimated spread)
relative to core investments, with target returns generally in the 12% to 15% range. The
value added in these types of real estate investments is frequently from an operational
standpoint, involving the correction of a deficiency in leasing, development,
management, or capitalization.
NCREIF characterizes opportunistic real estate investments as having a high level of risk
relative to core properties, with a tendency towards a total return that is substantially
driven by the appreciation component of the return. The target total return generally
exceeds 15% in order to compensate for the higher risk associated with the investment.
Investors would demand compensation for the higher risk associated with brownfields
investment. Thus, brownfields must offer a higher return to compensate for the additional
risk undertaken in the investment. Generally, investors seek returns in excess of about
20% for brownfields investments.
The location of brownfields investments along the target total return spectrum may
influence the types of pension funds and university or college endowments that invest in
them. Institutional investors select portfolio strategies "based on the underlying return
requirements of the assets they manage." (Fickes, 2000). Older pension funds or
university endowments with substantial retiree obligations may prefer to pursue a core
real estate investment strategy in order to mitigate the risk of capital depreciation and to
generate the current income returns necessary to fund the beneficiary obligations (Fickes,
2000). On the other hand, smaller pension funds or university endowments may tend to
pursue the higher returns associated with value-added and opportunistic strategies
(Fickes, 2000).
Changes in the economy and the value of individual portfolios also influence the
particular strategies that pension plan or university endowment sponsors may pursue. For
instance, by the year 2000, in response to changes in the capital markets, many
institutional investors had scaled back their return targets for real estate, and were tilting
more towards core and value-added real estate investment strategies than opportunistic
ones (Fickes, 2000). This was a marked change compared to the "speculative excess
characteristic" of the market during the maturation period of the late 1980s and early
The information provided in this section regarding institutional investment strategies and associated return
expectations was derived from the NCREIF Portfolio Management Committee Investment Styles
1990s (Fickes, 2000). Due to the change in market conditions, by the year 2000, smaller
pension funds became a larger proportion of the U.S. pension funds focusing on
opportunistic real estate investments (Fickes, 2000).
However, the relatively illiquid nature of direct investment in real estate, which increases
during growth phases of the real estate cycle and tends to fall during the real estate
market downturns) limits its accessibility to smaller pension funds and institutions
(Lindahl, 2002). The proliferation of real estate opportunity funds as well as the
securitization of real estate (such as REITs) increased the ability of smaller pension plans
and endowments to invest in opportunistic real estate (Fickes, 2000). Yet, the relatively
constrained options for investment in real estate faced by smaller pension funds and
endowments should significantly impact the extent of institutional capital flows towards
brownfields redevelopment during periods of market maturation.
When there are larger institutional investors focused on opportunistic real estate
strategies, there will tend to be more capital available for those types investment, and
potentially through a myriad of investment vehicles, particularly direct investment
through joint venture partnerships. While there is limited historical data on the efent of
institutional opportunistic real estate investment, David Gelter of the MIT Center for Real
Estate indicates that institutional interest in opportunistic real estate investing increases
when there is the perception of "value" that can be achieved due to "bargain" pricing
(Geltner, 2003). As changes in real estate pricing tend to be cyclical, this significantly
influences changes in access to institutional capital for brownfield developers.
Exit Strategy
As discussed above, liquidity concerns have had a significant influence on institutional
investment in the real estate asset class as a whole. Investment in real estate is generally
perceived to be less liquid relative to alternative investments such as stocks and bonds.
This has been a major factor in the under-weighting of real estate within pension plan and
Definitions draft White Paper.
university endowment portfolios. Since the 1980s, brownfields were perceived as highly
illiquid due to the liability risks associated with acquisition of a contaminated property
under federal legislation passed and interpreted during the 1980s and 1990s as well as the
limited financing available for undertaking the acquisition of a contaminated property.
The impact of these forces often translated into reduced market values for contaminated
real estate that was separate from the negative impact to market value associated with the
direct remediation costs that reduced the cash flows derived from the property (Jackson,
2001).
However, recent research indicates that there are significant changes in the pricing and
availability of financing for environmentally contaminated commercial and industrial
properties as the remediation process is undertaken for the property. Jackson's (2001)
study of the risk perceptions of commercial and industrial lenders with regard to
environmental contamination addressed whether perceived risks varied with a property's
remediation or cleanup status, and whether market conditions had an "intervening effect"
on environmental risk. The formal survey research undertaken for the study, using a
statistically representative national sample of commercial and industrial mortgage
lenders, quantified the precise changes in lender risk perceptions during the remediation
cycle, and yielded benchmark risk measurements of the probability of being able to
obtain financing for particular property types and environmental conditions that were
included in the study. The survey specifically focused on source site groundwater
contamination, which generally involved more complicated methods to estimate the
extent of contamination.
Jackson found that, assuming a creditworthy hypothetical borrower, for commercial and
industrial properties for which no cleanup had been performed and no approved
remediation plan was in place, only 6.8% of the lenders would provide a mortgage loan
on the property. During the cleanup phase, most of the lenders (54.3%) would provide a
mortgage loan on the property with adjustments to the terms and conditions of the loan,
such as a decrease in the loan-to-value ratio. Using multiple methods, the changes in
lender risk perceptions based on the remediation status were found to be statistically
significant at the .001 level, proving the hypothesis that remediation status does affect
lender perceptions of risk.
Changes in lender perceptions of risk associated with contaminated properties based on
the remediation status of the property has meaningful implications for institutional
investors pursuing urban brownfield investments. The study suggests that the availability
of financing for urban brownfields is not static; the incidence of contamination does not
drastically reduce the pool of financing sources for brownfields projects indefinitely.
Rather, the availability of financing for the institutional investor should increase
significantly as the remediation is performed for the property. In addition, once the
remediation is complete, the availability of financing for a creditworthy borrower should
not have a negative impact (based on prior contamination) on the pool of buyers for the
property.
In the same study, Jackson also found that lender risk perceptions also changed based on
real estate cycle trends. The lender survey quantified the effects of market conditions on
risk perceptions through a series of scenarios. Respondents indicated whether their risk
perceptions of a contaminated property would rise, fall, or be indifferent to whether the
general market demand was strong or weak, and whether the remediation had not yet
begun, was underway, or had been completed. Jackson's study revealed that the risk
reduction associated with a strong market was statistically significant at the .001 level in
all but one scenario combination, that in which remediation had not yet begun. The
increase in lender risk perceptions associated with a weak market was statistically
significant in all three phases of the remediation cycle (before, during, and after cleanup).
These results also have important implications for pension plans and university
endowments pursing investments in brownfields. The longer investment horizon of
pension plan and university endowment sponsors is especially suited to taking advantage
of the impact of changes in market conditions to the marketability of the property. The
longer-term investment horizon enables pension plans and university endowments to buy
and sell property according to market conditions (Lindahl, 2002). Pension plans and
university endowments are in the position to ride out weak periods in the market and take
advantage of upswings in the real estate cycle. The confluence of strategically timed
dispositions of urban brownfield properties and particular phases in the real estate cycle
could result in enhanced pricing associated with greater financing opportunities available
for the new buyer.
In another study, Jackson (2002) analyzed the impact of remediation status on the pricing
at which industrial properties traded in the real estate market. The environmental risk
factors reflected the investment and lending risk related to "uncertainties concerning
cleanup requirements, liabilities, and other factors." The study found that industrial
properties that had not undergone remediation traded at prices that were estimated at 30%
less than properties that were not contaminated. However, once the remediation was
completed, Jackson found that the pricing for properties that had undergone remediation
were "indistinguishable" from comparable properties that had experienced no
contamination (Jackson, 2002). Jackson noted the "price reduction and rebound"
provided an attractive investment opportunity for venture capital and opportunity funds
(Jackson, 2002).
Under CERCLA legislation and subsequent interpretations of the law during the 1990s,
the severely limited pool of buyers for contaminated properties was a strong deterrent to
institutional investment in brownfields. The relative ease of transactions involving
greenfields, and the growth of the suburban residential and office markets during the
early to mid- 1990s contributed to the continued focus of institutional investment away
from urban infill markets. The preponderance of brownfield sites within the stock of
available real estate in urban core markets further exacerbated the difficulty of drawing
institutional capital. However, institutional concerns regarding the ability to exit a
brownfield investment and realize an appreciation gain appropriate to the level of risk
involved in the investment have been aptly addressed by Jackson's studies regarding
environmental risk perceptions and pricing.
Investment Scale of Brownfield Projects
Urban infill transactions have traditionally fallen below the minimum investment size
threshold for institution investment. According to Shekar Narasimhan of Prudential Real
Estate Fixed Income Investors, urban infill transactions "tend to be smaller and more
complex, and the development entities tend to be locally based and narrowly focused,"
contributing to the difficulty of finding large transaction opportunities (Gordon, 2002).
The majority of brownfield sites, such as gas station and dry cleaner cleanups, can be
addressed through regional or local capital resources in conjunction with community
development organizations (Gerst, 2002). However, the proportion of brownfield sites
that are estimated to be of institutional size represents a substantial pool of real estate
projects. Tom Darden of Cherokee Investment Partners, a leader in real estate opportunity
funds focused on brownfields redevelopment, estimated the proportion of brownfield
sites appropriate for institutional investment at 10%, or 40,000 to 60,000 sites located in
the domestic market (Gerst, 2002).
Infrastructure of Pension Plans and University Endowments
The complexity of urban brownfield transactions is a significant factor in contributing to
the need for adequate access to real estate expertise in order to successfully and prudently
pursue such opportunities. Pension funds and university endowments that have formal in-
house real estate research capability will tend to have greater access to real estate
expertise (Ziering & Worzala, 1997). A survey of institutional investor preferences for
real estate research revealed that of the 73% of the funds that were over $5 billion in size,
77% had "dedicated in house real estate professionals and 27% employ[ed] in-house real
estate research staff' (Ziering & Worzala, 1997). Of the funds that participated in the
survey that were under $5 billion in size, none of the medium-size funds had any formal
in-house real estate research capacity and only 2% of the smallest funds did (Ziering &
Worzala, 1997).
In reference to recent institutional focus on urban infill investments, Mike McCook,
senior investment officer for CalPERS was quoted in an article of the Institutional Real
Estate Letter on the issue of the small size of many such projects, which translates into
the need for "a lot of these projects to generate a sufficient portfolio" (Gordon, 2002). He
stated that CalPERS, the largest pension plan in the nation, had the "luxury of
accumulating smaller and more focused portfolios" for its noncore strategy (Gordon,
2002). While for funds with limited real estate staff, "increasing the number and
complexity of their real estate holdings may be problematic" (Gordon, 2002). Even if
relatively smaller funds have access to in-house real estate research expertise, the
complexity and time-intensive nature of urban infill investments, particularly brownfield
investments, may lead to the conclusion that "a well-diversified core portfolio strategy
may be more attractive to smaller plan sponsors simply because they can keep larger
amounts of capital in play" (Gordon, 2002).
However, the demographic changes revealed in the 2000 U.S. Census suggest that larger
institutional investors that are in a position to fund smaller, more focused real estate
investment strategies may be best positioned to meet market demand in the longer term.
According to a report by Lend Lease, "A Nation of Niches," the 2000 Census revealed
"that more and more real estate demand will be specialized and best served by niche
players" (Lachman and Brett, 2002). The contrast between the large assets that have
historically characterized institutional equity investment in real estate and the small scale
that characterizes niche opportunities may trigger a response in the real estate advisory
community towards more targeted, smaller commingled funds as well as an increasing
focus on equity joint venture partnerships (Lachman and Brett, 2002).
Market Expertise
For urban brownfield projects in infill markets that were significantly comprised of low-
income households and people of color, there may have been the perception within the
institutional community that there was insufficient disposable income to warrant
investment and that unfamiliarity with the demographic profile of diverse communities
would lead to a mismatch in real estate use or leasing. One challenge cited in an industry
newsletter regarding pension plan capital and urban infill investment was the "lack of
qualified or 'underwritable' sponsors or joint-venture partners" (Gordon, 2002). The
growth in the number of real estate entrepreneurial firms that have targeted urban infill
markets and communities of color has contributed to the increase in the pipeline of
professionals that have demonstrated expertise in these markets. Examples of such niche
real estate developers include MacFarlane Partners and the Canyon-Johnson Fund, both
of which target urban infill markets and target the institutional capital base for funding.
Chapter IV: Recent Trends in Institutional Investment in Urban Brownfields
Institutional investment in the real estate equity market changes over time in response to
fluctuations in capital market conditions. Reliable data on the number of brownfields
projects that have been undertaken across the nation is unavailable. Thus, it is difficult to
estimate the number of urban brownfields projects that have been funded through
institutional capital. However, recent trends in pension fund commitments and indications
of market norms for environmental risk tolerance based on survey evidence provide an
indication of the extent and structure of institutional activity in brownfields
redevelopment.
Changes in Environmental Risk Tolerance Amongst Pension Plans 2
As discussed above, many institutional investors adopted a zero-tolerance policy with
regard to environmental risk in the aftermath of the CERCLA legislation and legal
interpretations of the 1980s. However, the results of a recent survey suggest that there has
been a marked change in market norms of institutional tolerance for environmental risk in
recent years. The staff of one of the nation's larger pension plans, in conjunction with
Pension Consulting Alliance, conducted a survey of eleven large institutional investment
managers to "determine market norms" for environmental risk tolerance amongst their
pension plan clientele. Investment managers included in the survey covered a broad range
of real estate equity investment strategies and investment structures. Core, value-added,
and opportunistic investment strategies were represented, as well as separate account and
commingled fund investment vehicles. With over $63 billion in aggregate net assets
(excluding leverage) of real estate pension plan capital under the management of the
survey respondents, the survey group was considered representative of the institutional
real estate market. According to an annual report prepared by Lend Lease Real Estate
Investments and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, as of September of 2002, pension funds
owned 36.9% ($148.7 billion) of the $402.8 billion real estate equities market, about a
2 Information for this section was derived from a July 2003 interview with Michael DiRe of the California
State Teachers' Retirement System and a hardcopy internal memo on the survey results.
3% increase over the previous year's share (Fickes, 2003).
Based on the recommendations of an advisory firm that is well known in acquisition of
brownfield properties, the Pension Consulting Alliance developed an environmental risk
scale to analyze institutional tolerance for varying levels of environmental risk associated
with a particular real estate equity investment. Components of environmental risk
included extent and type of environmental concern (including impact to adjacent
properties), degree to which the timing and cost of remediation are quantifiable, state and
federal agency signoff, availability of environmental insurance, and indemnification
requirements. Survey respondents were asked to indicate the environmental risk level
their pension fund clientele would be willing to accept.
The environmental risk scale ranged from 0 to 10 based on Phase I and II Site
Assessments, with 0 representing no recognizable environmental condition (i.e., new
project on farmland) and 9-10 representing a major environmental condition (i.e.,
Superfund site). The 1-2 risk range represented a site suspected of environmental
contamination, with readily quantifiable environmental concern that is limited to the site.
The seller would perform any remediation prior to site acquisition. Non-conditional No
Further Actions (NFA) letter and No Further Remediation (NFR) documentation would
be required prior to acquisition, as well as environmental insurance and indemnification.
The 3-4 risk range represented sites in which the site assessments yield the possibility or
probability of an environmental condition that is easily quantifiable and limited to the
site. In this range, remediation may occur after acquisition with a fixed price remediation
contract in hand, and NFA and NFR documentation preferred but not required prior to the
transaction close.
The 5-6 risk range represented sites with a probable or known environmental condition
that is determinable but may have impacted adjacent sites. Timing and cost of the
remediation is largely quantifiable, and may be performed after the transaction close. The
NFA and NFR documentation is preferred but not required prior to acquisition, but may
include conditions for ongoing or future monitoring. Environmental insurance is required
while indemnification is preferred but not required for that risk range.
The 7-8 risk range represented sites with a known environmental condition, where the
extent and type of environmental concern is less determinable and may have impacted
adjacent properties. The timing and cost of the remediation is less predictable, and may
surpass or approach the intended investment hold period. The NFA/NFR documentation
is the same as it is for the 5-6 risk range, as is the indemnification requirement.
Environmental insurance for sites in the 7-8 risk range may be unavailable.
The results of the survey indicated that most pension funds are willing to tolerate some
level of environmental risk in their real estate portfolios. While no pension plan clients
were willing to tolerate the risk associated with environmental conditions in the 9-10
range, the vast majority of survey respondents (about 90%) indicated that their pension
plan clientele would tolerate risk in the 1-6 risk levels. The zero-tolerance level
represented 5% of pension fund clientele, 1-2 represented 27.8%, 3-4 represented 29.2%,
5-6 represented 33.2%, and 7-8 represented 5.0%.
The advent of risk mitigation tools such as environmental insurance and NFR and NFA
documentation has addressed some of the major issues that have historically limited
institutional investment in brownfields. These tools have substantially expanded the
comfort level that an institutional investor could achieve when evaluating a brownfield
transaction, thereby enabling them to pursue higher risk-adjusted return opportunities in
markets and locations that may have been overlooked before.
Trends in Pension Fund Commitments
Pension fund commitments represent the investment goals of particular funds and can be
indicative of broader trends in institutional real estate strategies and pending capital flows
into the real estate market. The allocations in the year 2002 pension fund commitments
highlight the growing awareness of brownfields investment opportunities that fit the
pension fund investment framework. In 2002, pension funds committed $4.4 billion to
the real estate sector, with the Washington State Investment Board committing a $250
million mandate for a brownfields strategy with Cherokee Investment Partners (Real
Estate Finance and Investment (REFI), 2003). That year, opportunistic searches
accounted for 25% of all completed searches (REFI, 2003). Cherokee Investment
Partners is one of the leaders in opportunity funds that focus exclusively on brownfields
and use institutional capital (in part) to do so. Fully 80 percent to the capital for the
Cherokee fund is from tax-exempt sources, with such large pension plans as the
Washington State Investment Board participating (Gerst, 2002). Recent trends in pension
fund commitments also indicate the magnitude of the growing investment capital flows
towards urban infill projects, which tend to involve environmental remediation. "Urban
renewal" mandates accounted for 19% ($830 million) of pension fund commitments in
2001 (REFI, 2002). It is likely that the brownfield and urban renewal categories alone
underestimate the number and scale of institutional investments in urban brownfields, as
some funds that are classified as "opportunistic" may include urban brownfield projects
as part of the full range of their target investments.
According to the National Brownfield Association, in recent years, non-specialty real
estate funds have increasingly begun to "test the brownfield waters," which has
contributed to the normalization of brownfields within the overall real estate equity
investment universe (Brownfield News, 2002). This will continue to significantly
contribute to more brownfields redevelopment activity funded through institutional
investment funds (Brownfield News, 2002).
Institutional Investment in Brownfields-Focused Joint Ventures
During the mid- to late-i 990s, several joint ventures formed to exclusively pursue
brownfields investments. These partnerships were often formed between engineering
firms, which had expertise in environmental remediation, and major real estate firms that
had access to capital. Some of the ventures drew upon institutional capital to fund the
deals (Cassidy, 2003). The joint venture partners perceived "a rare opportunity to profit
from the market's aversion" to brownfields (Carlson, 2001). However, many of them
underestimated the complexity of the brownfields deals, and expected to be able to
produce sufficient transaction volume from the "low hanging fruit" (Cassidy, 2003).
Some believed that the profit made on the environmental costs would provide the
financing for the project (Theriot, 2001). However, the significant drop in cleanup costs,
primarily due to the adoption of risk-based standards, as well as increases in property
prices compromised the viability of that strategy (Theriot, 2001). Furthermore, many of
the ventures failed simply because they chose projects in which the "real estate
fundamentals were absent" - environmental cleanup was not going to transform a poor
real estate deal into a good one (Cassidy, 2003). According to Carlson Environmental,
Inc., many of those joint ventures did not "last beyond an initial flurry of activity,"
despite relatively large sums of capital behind the ventures (Carlson, 2001). Examples of
such ventures included the Dames & Moore/Brookhill joint venture and the CB Richard
Ellis/ENSR alliance (Carlson, 2001). However, by 2001, the retreat of many of the
specialty ventures from the brownfield market coincided with an overall increase in the
number of brownfield transactions, with an increasing share of activity driven by REIT
and traditional real estate developers.
REITs
Institutional investors may be indirectly investing in brownfields by investing in REITs
that pursue brownfield investment opportunities that fit their overall development
strategy. REITs tend to specialize in a particular property type. Thus, as many
brownfields were the result of contamination due to past industrial and commercial uses
on the site, industrial REITs tend to have relatively more experience closing brownfields
deals. For example, while the industrial REIT AMB does not focus exclusively on
brownfields, the firm had achieved a significant level of brownfield savvy such that,
during the 1990s, the company joined with AIG, the leading environmental insurer, to
start a fund focusing exclusively on brownfields for retail use (Martin Lamb, 2003).
CenterPoint Properties is another example of a REIT that focuses on industrial real estate
development and has roughly a third of its development portfolio in urban brownfields
(Leon, 2003). Average total returns since its initial public offering ten years ago are
estimated at 21% (Leon, 2003).
Retail and residential REITs have also pursued urban brownfield opportunities. General
Growth Properties (GGP) achieved a degree of brownfields remediation savvy through
their shopping center investments. GGP has received significant attention from the
Urban Land Institute for its 1998 Brass Mill shopping center in Waterford, Connecticut.
The Brass Mill Center redevelopment involved the remediation and redevelopment of an
urban industrial site (Simons and Leccese, 1998). The Urban Land Institute also
recognized the brownfield redevelopment work of AvalonBay (formerly Avalon
Properties), a residential REIT that developed the Avalon Cove project on a former
Conrail rail-yard in Jersey City, New Jersey (ULI, 2003). Avalon Cove is a waterfront
mid-rise housing development in an ethnically diverse community that benefits from its
close proximity and good transportation network with Manhattan.
Opportunity Funds
Real estate opportunity funds emerged in the early 1990s. Their emergence was in
reaction to "global real estate market crash in the late 1980s and early '90s," which, in
conjunction with changes in regulatory and tax policy, caused a withdrawal of "important
capital sources" from the real estate industry (Connor and Liang, 2003). The capital flight
associated with the collapse of the savings and loan industry further weakened the
domestic real estate market (Connor and Liang, 2003). One of the few sources of private
investment capital came in the form of opportunity funds, which emerged to take
advantage of the "massive liquidations of real estate holdings by financial institutions and
other distressed sellers" (Connor and Liang, 2003). When the real estate market was
down, the number of these types of funds was high (Connor and Liang, 2003). However,
as the market began to recover, there were fewer domestic projects that offered the
opportunistic returns that they were looking for, and many of the funds began to "migrate
down the risk/return spectrum to take advantage of value-added opportunities" (Connor
and Liang, 2003).
In their search for investment opportunities that would offer opportunistic returns, many
opportunity funds have become increasingly involved in projects that entail
environmental remediation. As discussed above, due to the tendency towards deal
complexity and the necessary remediation period, brownfields tend to require a relatively
longer time period to close the transaction as well as a relatively longer period to realize
returns versus core real estate investments. In this regard, the increasing role of real estate
opportunity funds in brownfields redevelopment is a positive sign. As Thomas Saylak of
Blackstone Real Estate Advisors indicated in an interview for the National Real Estate
Investor, opportunistic funds tend to have a "higher tolerance for problems in a deal" and
"assets with eccentric cash flow patterns" (Frantz, 1999).
Pension fund allocations to opportunity funds vary according to market conditions. In
1998, opportunity funds represented approximately 26%, or 23 of the 87, of pension fund
mandates (REFI, 1999). By 2000, opportunity funds accounted for 6 of the 93 searches
(REFI, 2001). The "tepid interest" continued through 2001, then rose to account for 25%
of completed searches in 2002, reflecting perceptions of weakness in the real estate
market and interest in taking advantage of "opportunistic plays" (REFI, 2002).
Equity Joint Ventures
Equity joint ventures can offer institutional investors a way "to pursue a sustained and
focused strategy with talented and seasoned organizations," and can be a viable
alternative to opportunity funds (Steinfeld et. al., 2002). Joint ventures with
entrepreneurial private operators enable pension plans and university endowments to
deploy "larger amounts of capital with high-quality partners under favorable terms"
(Rosen and Anderson, 1999). With regard to urban real estate equity investment, some of
the larger pension funds have taken the lead in committing capital to pursue niche
opportunities in order to generate higher risk-adjusted returns (Gordon, 2002). According
to an industry newsletter, these institutional investment leaders include CalPERS,
California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS), AFL-CIO Housing Investment
Trust, the Methodist Church, Los Angeles county Employees Retirement Association,
New York City Retirement Systems, and New York State Teachers' Retirement System
and the New York State Common Fund (Gordon, 2002). According to the article, many
of these institutions are drawn to the opportunities to capitalize on the mismatch between
supply and demand in urban infill markets. CalPERS, a prominent and powerful pension
plan, recently launched a strategic approach to urban infill investment throughout the
state of California. Seven different equity initiatives were launched, resulting in
investment strategies that address the full range of infill investment opportunities in the
California market, including office, industrial, residential, retail, and mixed-use projects
(Mattson-Teig, 2002).
Historically, institutional investors overlooked many real estate opportunities in urban
infill markets, particularly those in the urban core. Issues such as the perception of a
substantially limited exit strategy associated with urban infill investments, lack of
expertise in appropriately analyzing the demographics and meeting the demand profiles
of ethnically and racially diverse communities, and the complexity of navigating the
approval process of established urban municipalities were exacerbated by environmental
legislation that targeted "deep pocket" real estate investors in the chain of title for
contaminated sites. As the use and availability of environmental tools to mitigate risk
have become more widely available at competitive pricing levels, and capital market
conditions have resulted in a renewed focus on real estate as an asset class and
opportunities to generate value by targeting underserved markets, the flow of institutional
capital towards urban brownfields in infill communities through equity joint venture
investment vehicles has increased.
Private Equity in Real Estate Firms
Increasing acceptance amongst institutional investors regarding private equity
investments, combined with the competitive pressures within the domestic real estate
market, have fueled the, admittedly limited, institutional inteest in real estate private
equity as an investment vehicle (Conner and Liang, 2003). Private equity investment
entails taking an equity stake at the corporate entity level, typically a controlling interest,
to fund "the creation and expansion of companies with new and innovative ideas"
((Falzon et. al., 2002 and Conner and Liang, 2003). Real estate private equity offers
better access to real estate expertise and an enhanced alignment of interests "between
investors and the management of the entity through co-investment capital and entity-
level, performance-based compensation structures" (Falzon et. al., 2002). By taking an
equity stake at the entity level, investors are able to increase and broaden their
participation at the "value creation" stage, often the state during which the property is
developed or redeveloped, which can translate into opportunities for higher returns
(Falzon et. al., 2002).
As discussed above, the real estate market is cyclical and investors with a longer
investment horizon are well positioned to take advantage of cyclical opportunities that
can produce superior returns. The private equity investment structure can enhance an
institutional investor's ability to do so. The private equity structure offers the opportunity
to take an equity interest in a real estate company that has a niche focus in which the
clearly "defined scope and strategy helps identify and capitalize on cyclical opportunities
in a particular market or location" (Falzon et. al., 2002). Unlike the equity joint venture
structure, the private equity structure offers "proprietary access to the entity's transaction
pipeline" (Falzon et. al., 2002). As institutional investors, including pension plans and
university endowments, increasingly use the private equity investment structure to gain
exposure to higher risk-adjusted return opportunities, niche firms that focus on
opportunities in urban markets that are burdened with environmentally contaminated sites
will have better access to institutional capital.
An example of how this can contribute to institutional activity in brownfield
redevelopment in urban core communities is the private equity transaction involving
CalPERS and MacFarlane Partners. In 1999, in conjunction with raising the CalPERS
stake in the California Urban Investment Partners joint venture with MacFarlane Partners,
the pension fund also took a 10% equity ownership position in MacFarlane Urban Retail
Company, "one of the leading minority- owned real estate investment firms in the nation"
(CalPERS, 1999). MacFarlane Urban Retail Company focuses on retail opportunities in
urban cores and transit corridors, particularly those with significant minority populations
(MacFarlane Partners). The equity stake entitled CalPERS the "first right to act as the
primary investor in all new MacFarlane urban business opportunities" (CalPERS, 1999).
Given the manufacturing and commercial uses that dominated the early development of
many urban core communities, the transaction enhanced CalPERS's exposure to higher
yielding real estate opportunities that are likely to involve brownfield sites, such as the
Bay Street project included as a case study in this thesis.
Chapter V: Case Study Methodology
Three case studies are included in this paper for the purpose of highlighting examples of
successful urban brownfield redevelopment projects funded in part through institutional
capital. This thesis was particularly time constrained, about three months, thus there were
limitations on the scope and availability of information from primary sources. The case
studies were selected based on affirmative responses from major firms that have been
active in the brownfields market and responded to my inquiries regarding the use of their
projects for case studies. In addition, the focus of this thesis on urban brownfields, and
the implications of institutionally funded brownfield redevelopment in urban
communities of color, further limited the case studies included herein to those that were
located in ethnically diverse communities.
The case studies included in this paper are therefore not representative of the scale or
structure of institutional investment in urban brownfield projects in infill locations, nor
are they representative of the range of environmental issues that may impact such
projects. Rather, the primary purpose of the case studies is to illustrate that institutional,
particularly pension plan and university endowment, investment in brownfield projects
located in urban core areas is taking place and can have meaningful implications for the
pace and scale of revitalization efforts in urban communities of color.
Chapter VI: Case Studies 3
Case I: Bay Street - Emeryville, CA4
Project Description
Bay Street is a new, mixed-use development in Emeryville, California. The development
is the culmination of the environmental remediation efforts of the city of Emeryville, and
the private investment of Madison Marquette, a national retail development firm,
CalPERS, the largest pension plan in the nation, and MacFarlane Partners, a leading real
estate investment firm focusing on urban, infill projects.
The 400,000 square foot project was built on a former industrial brownfield and Native
American shellmound in a predominantly minority neighborhood (MacFarlane Partners).
The $400.0 million "urban village" spans three city blocks and, when complete, will
include urban streetscape retail with an approximately 80/20 mix of apartments and
condominium units (MacFarlane Partners). The retail component has an entertainment
focus, pairing national and local retail stores and restaurants, and a 16-screen AMC
Theater.
3 Unless otherwise noted, information is drawn from interviews and hardcopy materials listed at the end of
each case study.
' Picture source: http://www.macfarlanepartners.com/projects/baystreet3.html
Site History
The Bay Street site has a rich history of which we are now aware. "Tribelets" belonging
to the Ohlone language group of Native Americans lived on the site beginning around
800 b.c. (City of Emeryville). Archaeologists believe that the Ohlone tribelets used part
of the site as a community cemetery (DelVecchio, 2002). Over a long period of time, a
shellmound developed on the site, representing what is believed to be the largest
shellmound in the Bay Area and possibly the entire state of California (City of
Emeryville) The dig associated with the Bay Street project uncovered "2000 sets of
remains from a buried, 8-foot-deep section" of a burial mound dated at 2,800 years old
(DelVecchio, 2002). The 40-ft high burial mount was leveled by steam shovels in 1924 to
clear the way for the construction of a paint factory (DelVecchio, 2002). During the
leveling process, an archaeologist recovered the remains of 700 Ohlone (DelVecchio,
2002).
The manufacturing uses that dominated the city of Emeryville from the 1920s to the
1960s caused the extensive environmental contamination that eventually plagued the site.
During that time, Sherwin-Williams Company operated a paint manufacturing plant on
the site (Greenwich and Hinckle, 2003). Sherwin-Williams sold the site to Elementis
Pigments, the iron oxide pigment manufacturer, who operated the site through 2000
(Greenwich and Hinckle, 2003). Neighboring tenants contributed to the toxic wastes that
had been released into the soil by Sherwin-Williams and Elementis (Greenwich and
Hinckle, 2003). According to the City, the 22-acre site was the location of "a lime and
sulfur plant, an insecticide and spray plant, steel storage, a trucking company, a plant
producing iron oxide pigments, and storage of used drums and barrels prior to
reconditioning" (City of Emeryville, 1999). The City review of the site yielded evidence
of "petroleum hydrocarbon compounds, benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylenes, lead,
arsenic, oil and grease in the soil and groundwater" (City of Emeryville, 1999).
Neighborhood Context
In 1927, the future Chief Justice of the United States, Earl Warren (then the Alameda
County District Attorney) referred to Emeryville as "the dirtiest little town on the Pacific
Coast" (Temple, 2002). The small city, situated on the eastern shore of the San Francisco
Bay, is located between Oakland and Berkeley. The city's pro-growth orientation has
contributed to its challenges and successes as a small city that has had to grapple with
traditionally "big city" problems.
In the 1850s, Emeryville emerged as a major industrial community in the East Bay
region. Through World War II, the city functioned as part of the East Bay manufacturing
hub and accommodated the plants of such heavy industrial and manufacturing firms as
Sherwin-Williams, Chevron, Westinghouse-Electric, Judson Steel, and Del Monte (City
of Emeryville). The East Bay region suffered during the post-war decline, with the flight
of industry and jobs becoming more pronounced during the 1970s (City of Emeryville).
The decline in the manufacturing industry resulted in increases in poverty rates amongst
the inner-East Bay communities (Greenwich and Hinckle, 2003). The legacy of the heavy
industrial and manufacturing concentration was extensive soil and groundwater
contamination, and exacerbated the lack of private investment in those communities. The
arduous clean-up standards and, in particular, the liability risks imposed by the
environmental regulations enacted during the 1980s drastically stemmed the tide of
redevelopment within inner-East Bay communities like Emeryville. This contributed to a
trend of blight and abandonment within the city, which translated into a 20% vacancy
rate for non-residential property, with 40% underutilized (City of Emeryville).
The fact that most of the city's poor lived in neighborhoods bordered by brownfields
illustrated the influence of environmental risks on underserved communities in the urban
core (EPA, 2001). Almost half of the city population reporting income levels that would
be categorized as low-income, and more than 50% of the city's residents identified as
people of color (EPA, 2001). In the aftermath of the flight of heavy industry, an artist
community was established within the city of Emeryville, which emerged during the
1970s. Many of the obsolete facilities were converted into artists' studios, which
translated into below-market rates for studio space (City of Emeryville, 1999). By 2001,
the resident artist community represented 15 percent of the City's population (Marech,
2001). The "high percentage of resident artists" in Emeryville is a source of "great civic
pride" (City of Emeryville, 1999).
Emeryville's prime location near the eastern end of the Bay Bridge contributed to a
powerful trend - the cost of remediation for the City's "640 tainted acres" was greatly
outpaced by the price of land (Bole, 1997). By the early 1990s, 60% of the City's
commercial and industrial land was considered underutilized, with 55% environmentally
contaminated (Vitulli, 2002). The City of Emeryville's Redevelopment Agency (ERA)
began to explore strategies to remediate and redevelop the contaminated sites that marred
the community. The City identified the site of the current Bay Street project in the late
1980s as a prime location for a retail center and the ERA began to assemble parcels for
what would become the Bay Street project in 1993 (Greenwich and Hinckle, 2003).
The assembly of the Bay Street site parcels through eminent domain triggered the first of
two major lawsuits associated with the land (Greenwich and Hinckle, 2003). The
Elementis Pigments parcel was acquired by the City through eminent domain, and at a
much lower price than the seller was willing to accept (San Francisco Business Times,
1999). Elementis Pigments sued the City, winning a judgment for a $12.5 million price
tag in 1999, fully $6.5 less than what the Bay Street developers would eventually pay for
the land (San Francisco Business Times, 1999). The second lawsuit involved the City's
attempts to sue the former tenants, Sherwin-Williams and Elementis Pigments, to get
remuneration for the costs associated with the remediation of the Bay Street site
(Greenwich and Hinckle, 2003).
During the mid-1990s, Emeryville implemented three programs to address the
environmental contamination issues that challenged the city. The City developed a
system that functioned as a resource for developers and property owners that were
navigating the "complex regulatory process" associated with redeveloping brownfields
(Temple, 2002). In 1996, Emeryville received a $400,000 brownfields pilot grant from
the U.S. EPA to "test its land and compile a complete database of groundwater conditions
and contamination informaton" (Temple, 2002). The results of the study, released in the
late 1990s, revealed that groundwater between 30 feet and 100 feet was "relatively
clean," which was critical in resolving a lot of uncertainty that developers had regarding
the extent of cleanup, particularly the more complex groundwater component, associated
with redeveloping in Emeryville (Temple, 2002). Leveraging the EPA funds, the City
created a Groundwater Management Plan (GMP), which was intended to "protect public
health, deep groundwater resources, and ecological resources of San Francisco Bay while
providing regulatory relief and more cost certainty for property owners and developers"
(City of Emeryville). Under the GMP, the City assumed a degree of regulatory authority
through an agreement with the regulatory agencies (City of Emeryville). The
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the city and state agencies set soil
cleanup standards and pre-approved environmental remediation procedures (Vitulli et. al.,
2002)
In 1999, the EPA awarded Emeryville a $1 million grant under its Brownfields Cleanup
Revolving Loan Fund, which was used to create Capital Incentives for Emeryville's
Redevelopment and Remediation (CIERRA). CIERRA is a matching grant program that
leveraged federal, state, and local funding to provide low-interest loans for remediation
and redevelopment projects (Temple, 2002). The CIERRA program targeted smaller
parcels and sites that were located east of the railroad tracks (City of Emeryville).
The aggressive stance by the city of Emeryville to address its environmental challenges
resulted in positive changes in the community. As the Bay Area region began to benefit
from the strong economic growth of the 1990s, the active steps that the City had taken to
address the environmental contamination that plagued the community, and its pre growth
stance with regard to developers, positioned the City to diversify and increase the growth
of its economy.
Local Market Conditions
The concentration of high-tech firms in the Bay Area contributed to its strong growth as a
region during the mid- to late-i 990s. Emeryville, a city that is known as one that "since
the 1970s, has never met a construction project it didn't like," continued its
accommodating, pro-growth orientation to attract spillover from the booming San
Francisco and Berkeley areas. Emeryville is believed to have particularly benefited from
the politics of the city of Berkeley. One of the major economic anchors to the city of
Emeryville is the Chiron company, which was turned off by Berkeley's refusal repeal an
ordinance that gave Berkeley "a proprietary stake in research done" in the company's lab
(Levy, 2002). Chiron diverted its search for lab space to Emeryville, and paid one of the
biggest landlords in the City to develop its Richard Legoretta-designed campus on Hollis
Street (Levy, 2002). Between Chiron and Pixar, a major animation studio, Emeryville
draws thousands of office workers each day (Levy, 2002). In addition to those firms,
during the late 1990s, Emeryville was able to draw major developers, who built "millions
of square feet of office space, three major retail and entertainment centers, and several
large-scale dense housing projects" (Greenwich and Hinckle, 2003).
The growth in the Emeryville economy during the 1990s made clear the retail voids
within the Emeryville market. The economic decline of the 1970s and 1980s resulted in a
dearth of retail offerings for the Emeryville population base and other surrounding South
Bay communities. However, due to the City's proactive steps towards redevelopment, by
the late 1990s, the approximately 7,100 population of the city of Emeryville would swell
to 30,000 during the day (Greenwich and Hinckle, 2003). By 2003, there was over six
million square feet of Class A office space within five miles of the Bay Street site
(Madison Marquette). Within the primary trade area of the Bay Street project, which
entails the Berkeley/Oakland Hills West subsector, there was no regional mall presence
and the shopping center square footage per capita was roughly half the national average
(Madison Marquette).
As an infill location within the East Bay, the Bay Street site was quite complementary for
retail development. The site offers easy access from the Bay Bridge, which connects the
East Bay to San Francisco, and visibility from Interstate 80, which boasts daily traffic
volume of 260,000 cars (Madison Marquette). The site is located at the convergence of
Interstate 80, 1-580, and 1-880 as well as California Highway 24 (Madison Marquette). In
this way, the Bay Street site was a classic urban brownfield redevelopment opportunity
that held the attractiveness of proximity to a major urban center and ready access to
public infrastructure, as well as pent-up demand for real estate investment that had not
been met due to financial and liability risks associated with environmental remediation
and possibly, to a lesser degree, the perceived financial risks of investing in urban core
markets.
Site Remediation
The history of uses on the Bay Street site resulted in significant environmental
contamination including pesticides, metals, and organics (Department of Toxic
Substances Control (DOTSC), 2002). Past uses included a "drum recycling facility,
pigment manufacturer, pesticide repackaging facility and trucking facility" (DOTSC,
2002). The city of Emeryville, specifically its ERA, took responsibility for the
predevelopment environmental remediation of the Bay Street site. The ERA obtained a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the state EPA for brownfield redevelopment
based on a city-wide GMP, which was used for the remediation of the Bay Street site
(EPA, 2001). The ERA assumed the costs and operation of the remediation of the soil
and groundwater contamination. The groundwater contamination included arsenic,
pesticides, and hydrocarbon solvents (Greenwich and Hinckle, 2003).
Financing & Investment 5
The funding of the $400 million Bay Street redevelopment project involved a partnership
between the City of Emeryville, Madison Marquette, MacFarlane Partners, and CalPERS.
As stated above, remediation of the property was performed and financed by the City as
well as the costs of the legal expenses associated with pursuing the former owners of the
site for remuneration associated with those costs, which totaled $36.7 million.
5 The information in this section is based on information provided in Greenwich and Hinckle (2003) except
where noted.
A limited liability company for the retail component of the project, Bay Street Partners
LLC, was formed between Madison Marquette and California Urban Investment Partners
(CUIP), the joint venture between MacFarlane Partners and CalPERS (Murray, 2002). It
is an 80/20 partnership, with CUIP maintaining the majority equity interest. Bay Street
Partners LLC arranged $76 million in construction financing for the retail project
(Murray, 2002). The construction loan was structured as a three-year, interest only loan
with an adjustable rate set at less than 300 basis points (or 3%) over the LIBOR rate
(Murray, 2002). The financing was provided through CIBC, which then syndicated the
loan to Bank One and Commercial Bank (Murray, 2002).
The housing component of the Bay Street project is owned by Bay Street Residential
Partners LLC, another partnership between Madison Marquette and CUIP (Red Capital
Group, 2002). An investment banking firm worked with the City's ERA to issue $66.7
million in "tax-exempt, variable rate demand multifamily housing revenue bonds" on
behalf of Bay Street Partners LLC (Red Capital Group, 2002). At the time, late 2002, the
financing represented one of the largest new money, tax-exempt bond issues that utilized
a new bond allocation (Red Capital Group, 2002). For the affordable housing units
associated with the housing component of the Bay Street project, the City provided a $1
million grant.
Strategies to Reduce Liability
The extensive environmental contamination associated with the Bay Street site
represented financial and liability risks that would be fairly high on the risk spectrum,
particularly for institutional investors like pension plans and university endowments. The
willingness of the city of Emeryville to take on the risks associated with predevelopment
remediation of the property was critical to the viability of the project for private
investment. In this way, Emeryville exemplified the type of proactive stance that urban
municipalities can take in order to help facilitate the redevelopment of large parcels of
contaminated land in underserved communities.
In addition to taking responsibility for the remediation of the Bay Street site, the City of
Emeryville limited the financial risk associated with the development remediation of the
site by capping the costs associated with any further remediation of the site once the site
was developed. This was structured as a reduction in the purchase price paid by the
private investment entity by the amount of the additional remediation costs. Thus, the
investors, including CalPERS, were protected from additional financial risk associated
with the discovery of additional contamination onsite. Thus far, the costs associated with
development remediation, including those associated with the environmental consultant
and site monitoring, that are expected to be reimbursed by the City of Emeryville total an
estimated $5 to $6 million. The city of Emeryville acquired a pollution liability policy for
the retail component of the project, which was assigned to Bay Street Partners LLC.
Design
The concept for the Bay Street project was to have "a Main Street with industrial forms
and materials that harken back to Emeryville's manufacturing era" (Levy, 2001). The
hope for the project was that it would function as the town center that Emeryville never
had - because it was too "busy carving its own smoky niche as a haven for heavy
industry" (DelVecchio, 2002). The retail architects Jerde Partnership International and
Charles Group International designed the project as three city blocks that would be
connected by a main street (Oakland Tribune, 2002). The designers sought to create a
neighborhood feel to the project by incorporating colorful plazas, tree-lined walkways,
and terraces (Madison Marquette). The variation in the storefront design was intended to
render an organic texture to the development, with some storefronts representing
individual tenant designs and others presenting a "brick warehouse style" (Oakland
Tribune, 2002).
The project is a mixed-use development designed as an urban neighborhood rather than a
regional mall (DelVecchio, 2002). The retail component, which opened in November of
2002, offers a full range of local, national, and regional retail shopping tenants as well as
restaurants. Bay Street's south block is comprised of retail stores and restaurants, with an
entertainment component provided by the 3,300-seat stadium-style AMC theater
(Oakland Tribune, 2002). The north blocks are mixed-use, with retail on at street-level
and residential units above. The residential units include over 250 apartments, about 80
townhouses, and over 70 units of affordable housing (Madison Marquette). The project
will include a memorial park along Temescal Creek, which will commemorate the
historic Ohlone legacy associated with the site (Oakland Tribune, 2002). The project will
also include a 250-room mid-rise hotel, which is expected to open in 2005 (Madison
Marquette). To accommodate the traffic that the project is expected to attract, Bay Street
offers 1,900 parking spaces (Madison Marquette).
Market Acceptance
As of July 2003, the Bay Street project's retail component was 81% leased with about
87% of leases either signed or under negotiation. The list of retail tenants represents a
solid line-up, including such well-known retailers as Barnes & Noble, which took a
32,000-square foot store, "Williams-Sonoma, Pottery Barn, Pottery Barn Kids, Talbots,
Ann Taylor Loft, J. Jill, Chico's, Banana Republic, Express, Victoria's Secret, Gap, Old
Navy, Reference Clothing Co., Body Shop, AT&T, Franklin Covey, Aaron Brothers,
Sunshade, Bath & Body Works, Sunglass Hut, Godiva, Magnolia Hi-Fi, Aerosoles, Cold
Stone Creamery and Hot Cups" (East Bay Business Times, 2002). The success of the
Madion Marquette leasing team in attracting a critical mass of national, credit tenants
despite softening in the economy attests to the strength and magnitude of demand for
retail within the Emeryville market and surrounding communities.
Bay Street Project Contacts:
Michael Hoeffel
Investment Manager
MacFarlane Partners
Dirk Hallemeier
Senior Project Manager
MacFarlane Partners
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One Brigham Circle - Boston, MA6
Project Description
One Brigham Circle is a new, mixed-use development in the heart of the Boston
neighborhood of Mission Hill, an infill community with an ethnically diverse residential
base. The project was the result of an almost 10-year development process, which
included a 2-year community planning effort funded by Harvard Medical School, one of
the landowners. The joint venture was between Mission Hill Neighborhood Housing
Services, an innovative community organization, Northland Development Corporation
(NDC), a regional developer, and The New Boston Fund, an opportunity fund that targets
high-net-worth individuals and institutional capital.
The project includes approximately 6,000 square feet of retail space and 115,000 square
feet of office space. The "village square" retail format will include a supermarket, major
drugstore, bank branches, and neighborhood retail offerings. The office tenant is a major
medical institution in the Boston area, Partners Healthcare Systems, Inc., which signed a
long-term lease, creating a continued link between the medical institutions that anchor the
economy of Mission Hill and is a significant force in the Boston economy as a whole.
6 Picture source: Source: http://www.high-profile.com/2002/nov/1BrighamCircle.htm
Site History
For almost thirty years, the community of Mission Hill asked, "What is Harvard going to
do with the Ledge Site?" (Mission Hill Neighborhood Housing Services (MHNHS),
1995). The Ledge Site, together with the Calumet Site, form one corner of the "front
door," known as Brigham Circle, to the Mission Hill neighborhood of Boston,
Massachusetts. Brigham Circle is formed at the intersection of Tremont Street, Calumet
Street, and Huntington Avenue, which serves as the "Route 9" entrance to Boston
(MHNHS, 1995).
Brigham Circle was "once a thriving and vibrant commercial and retail center for the
community," but by the early 1990s, its role as the traditional town center had waned
significantly (MHNHS, 1995). The largest portion of the property was generally referred
to as the "Ledge Site." The Ledge Site was acquired by Harvard University in 1965 and
leased to Osco Drug Store, Sterling Cleaners and Laundromat, and a Bank of Boston
branch (MHNHS, 1995) As a community meeting place, Brigham Circle had transformed
from the "village square" to the "Osco parking lot."
Much of the Ledge Site, which had been designated an "Urban Wild" by the Boston
Redevelopment Authority in the 1970s, was sectioned off by fencing (MHNHS, 1995).
The fenced portion, primarily near the corner of Huntington Avenue and Tremont Street,
was considered in a local news report to be a "wilderness where only the homeless dared
to tread" (Anand, 1996).
The Calumet Site, a connecting parcel that fronted directly on the Brigham Circle
intersection, was the location of a former meat market. By the early 1990s, the building
on the parcel was occupied by three businesses that had been in operation for a number of
years, including a coffee shop, a bank, and a neighborhood market. The Siegel family
privately owned the parcel.
Neighborhood Context
Mission Hill is a working class neighborhood that was built on the historic Parker Hill, "a
rocky drumlin left behind by a prehistoric glacier" (MHNHS, 1995). Much of the One
Brigham Circle site functioned as Coleman's Quarry, where grayish rock called
puddingstone was extracted by the ton for use in constructing twenty three church
buildings in the city of Boston during the late 1800s (Palmer Jr., 2002). Coleman's
Quarry was well known for its puddingstone contribution to the twin-spire basilica of the
Mission Church, dedicated to Our Lady of Perpetual Help, which "dominated" the
neighborhood landscape and eventually "defined the neighborhood as Mission Hill" (The
Bostonian Society, 2001).
The Mission Hill neighborhood is "squeezed between" the Boston areas of "Jamaica
Plain, Roxbury, and Brookline"(McKim, 1997). The approximately 15,000-person
community was severely impacted by the suburban flight and urban renewal programs of
the 1960s and 1970s (Anand, 1996). Urban renewal programs implemented by the city of
Boston deeply scarred the neighborhood, particularly the 822-unit Mission Main public
housing project that the city allowed to deteriorate and "drain the economic vitality of the
community and surrounding neighborhood" (Fannie Mae).
The community was further hurt by the expansionary acquisitions of real estate by the
medical and educational institutions that dominated the area. The Longwood Medical
Area, across Huntington Avenue from One Brigham Circle and one of the largest medical
and educational centers in the country, consists of sixteen institutions, nine of which are
either Harvard Schools or Harvard-affiliated teaching hospitals (MHNHS, 1995). The
speculative acquisitions of real estate by medical and educational institutions during the
1970s and 1980s resulted in an antagonistic relationship between the Mission Hill
neighborhood and the institutions. One institution, the Lahey Hitchcock Clinic Medical
Center, bought "scores of houses on the back of Mission Hill and left them empty,"
originally expecting to expand into those locations but instead allowed the vacant homes
to become "a lonely pathway between burned-down houses and drug dens" (Anand,
1996).
During the 1970s, community groups fought the expansion of medical institutions like
Brigham and Women's Hospital, whose original main entrance fronted on Brigham
Circle, from crossing Huntington Avenue (Ortiz, 2001). The Ledge Site was on the
wrong side of line drawn by community activists for institutional expansion within the
neighborhood. The Mission Hill community "drew a line on Huntington and insisted on
no institutional expansion across that line" (Lupo, 1995). Thus, when the building boom
spread through Boston during the 1980s, the Ledge site, the "largest parcel of
undeveloped land in Mission Hill" and owned by Harvard Medical, was bypassed
(Anand, 1996). Harvard put the Ledge Site up for sale in 1984. Harvard's multiple
development efforts for research or clinical use failed due to the low yields associated
with the intended uses and community protest. In 1988, the Mission Hill Neighborhood
Housing Services organization expressed interest in the site. By March of the following
year, Harvard took the Ledge Site off the market in order to pursue development plans
with MHNHS.
Negative perceptions of the Mission Hill neighborhood emerged during the 1980s and
contributed to the lack of real estate development in the neighborhood. The Mission Main
public housing project was known for having the highest crime rate of all of the city's
public housing projects (Anand, 1996). In addition, the community received nationwide
media attention due to the highly publicized murder of Carol DiMaiti Stuart. In 1989,
Charles Stuart reported to the Boston police that, while driving home on the way back
from a childbirth class at Brigham and Women's Hospital, he and his pregnant wife had
been shot by a black man who jumped into their car (McNamara, 1999). The wife died,
and the child, born premature, died 17 days later (Radin, 1999). In response, the
neighborhood of Mission Hill was "swept through" by police and prosecutors who used
"every coercive and investigative weapon" at their disposal to find the suspect based on
Stuart's description (Radin, 1999). By the time the police realized that Charles Stuart had
murdered his wife and child, the reputation of Mission Hill had been smeared. Between
the high rates of crime that plagued the cities' inner city neighborhoods and the Stuart
case, the neighborhood "had become synonymous in the public mind with crime"
(Anand, 1996).
Positive developments in Mission Hill began to take root in the early 1990s. By the late
1980s, neighborhood nonprofit groups had purchased the Lahey Hitchcock Clinic
Medical Center's land and begun development of new townhouses, which lifted the
community home ownership rate (Anand, 1996). By 1996, the crime rate associated with
the public housing development had dropped by 50% as a result of a major police
crackdown and stepped-up enforcement (Anand, 1996). By 1997, Mission Main, the
notorious public housing development, was undergoing a multimillion dollar renovation
(McKim, 1997). The community had begun to benefit from renewed public investment
and the general boost, including rising property values, associated with the flourishing
Boston economy.
Local Market Conditions
The supply of retail and office space within the Mission Hill market had not kept pace
with demand by the time the economy rebounded in the mid-i 990s. By 1995, the
community of Mission Hill had limited retail offerings within the neighborhood. As part
of the community planning process, a market study was performed for the neighborhood.
The market analysis revealed that there was leakage of retail sales from the area. There
was no major grocery store or supermarket, the Osco Drug store was poorly run, and the
Ledge Site buildings were generally poorly maintained. To a large extent, the retail
offerings on the Ledge Site were "ghetto operations" that took advantage of the limited
mobility of a subsection of the Mission Hill residents by charging higher prices for
products.
The study found that there was 60,000 square feet of supply of retail stores in the Mission
Hill market, but enough demand to support 200,000 additional square feet (Lupo, 1995).
The resident base of the Mission Hill neighborhood numbered approximately 15,000
people. However, the proximity of the medical institution cluster, primarily the
Longwood Medical area, resulted in a population increase to about 45,000 people each
day (MHNHS, 1995). The medical institutions that dominated the "other side" of
Huntington Avenue employed about 27,000 people, educated approximately 10,000
students, and treated 1.1 million patients annually (MHNHS, 1995). The continued
growth of the Longwood Medical area transformed the relatively small Brigham Circle
residential base into an economically viable trade area.
The Mission Hill community may have drawn a line for institutional expansion at
Huntington Avenue, but it could not stem the growth of the Longwood Medical area. The
area's reported rate of growth was an increase of 1.5 million square feet of floor area per
decade (Campbell and Vanderwarker, 1995). Not only did the Longwood Medical area
represent a large pool of potential customers for the retail uses proposed for the One
Brigham Circle Project, it also represented a pool of potential tenants for the office space.
As such, the Longwood Medical Area was able to function as an anchor to the One
Brigham Circle development, attracting retail customers and offering office tenants that
would stabilize the project.
Two surveys were conducted as part of the market study evaluation of Mission Hill. A
shopper survey was performed for which there were 258 respondents, of whom about half
were residents and the other half were affiliated as a patient or employee with Longwood
Medical (MHNHS, 1995). The other survey was conducted exclusively with employees
of local medical institutions, for which there were 383 respondents (MHNHS, 1995). The
results were as follows:
Merchandise Category % of Respondents Type of Store
Shopper Survey
General Merchandise 40% Clothing, Shoe, Department,
Bookstore, "Galleria-type"
Food Markets 29% Supermarket, "Well-rounded
grocery market"
Restaurants 15% Sit-Down restaurant/Prepared
Foods
Employees of Local Medical Institutions
General Merchandise 45% Department, Clothing, Shoe,
Pharmacy
Restaurant & Food Uses 25% Sit-Down restaurant/Prepared
Foods
Recreation, Hobby, 20% Bookstore
Entertainment
Grocery 12% Supermarket, "Better grocery"
Source: MHNHS, 1995
The community planning process and eventual leasing of the One Brigham Circle project
reflected the community desires for an enhanced retail offering in the Brigham Circle
area. The new development offered the scale and quality necessary to attract a customer
base well beyond the Mission Hill residential base, which would enable the developers to
lure credit tenants to the development, further promoting the financial viability of the
project.
Site Remediation
Haley & Aldrich, Inc. performed an environmental site assessment for the Ledge Site.
The geotechnical and environmental consulting firm was hired by Harvard Medical
School to perform the evaluation in 1994 and 1995. Four test borings were drilled into the
ground of the subject site, and groundwater monitoring wells were installed for the
purpose of obtaining soil and groundwater samples (MHNS, 1995). According to Haley
& Aldrich, the findings of the assessment were "not dissimilar to those encountered at
urban sites having similar site usage."
The Haley & Aldrich report revealed that the lower portion of the site had experienced
environmental contamination associated with past and existing uses on-site. The soil
samples revealed elevated levels of petroleum in the vicinity of an underground fuel oil
storage tank and behind the dry cleaning facility. The soil and groundwater samples
revealed elevated levels of chlorinated solvents in areas of proximity to the dry cleaning
facility. The Massachusetts State Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) was
contacted regarding the findings. In addition, Haley & Aldrich recommended the removal
of the fuel oil tanks, both underground and aboveground, that were no longer in service.
The former quarry area, in the upper portion of the site, was not found to be
environmentally impacted. A test porting in that section of the site produced soil samples
that did not have elevated levels of contamination for soils located in a residential area.
Further environmental evaluations of the site revealed that the release of chlorinated
solvents had penetrated the bedrock and migrated offsite. Given the extent to which the
contaminants had migrated offsite, it was not financially feasible to exhaustively treat the
groundwater contamination. The residents of the state of Massachusetts are on a public
water supply, and do not rely on groundwater for drinking water. However, the Mission
Hill area of the city of Boston does have a combined sanitary sewer and storm drainage
system. According to the standards for reportable concentrations for soils located in a
residential area set by the Massachusetts DEP, the migration of the groundwater
contamination due to chlorinated solvents did not pose a significant public health risk.
The contaminated soil was extracted and hauled to a licensed facility. However, there
were unexpected costs that exceeded the remediation costs to treat the soil associated
with digging the holes for the foundations for the new buildings. The costs associated
with "dewatering" the holes and treating the water prior to discharge into the storm
drainage system resulted in unanticipated remediation costs.
The entire remediation cost for the new development was about $200,000. The
remediation took less than one year to complete and was able to be performed
concurrently with the development process. NDC filed a remediation action measure
(RAM plan) and produced a final report, which was submitted to the Massachusetts DEP.
A closure letter was filed with the DEP.
Financing & Investment
The development process for the project began in 1989, when MHNHS approached
Harvard Medical regarding the project. MHNHS had established a reputation within the
community for its efforts to stabilize Mission Hills deteriorating housing market in the
wake of urban renewal and suburban flight (Lupo, 1995). Harvard had sustained
successive failures in its attempts ta-eceive community approval for its development
efforts, and had finally approached the community. MHNHS organized a committee to
develop and extensive planning process that would allow the community to "define its
development objectives for the Ledge Site" (MHNHS, 1995). Harvard contributed
approximately $128,600 to the community planning effort, which culminated in an
extensive development plan (MHNHS, 1995). Harvard negotiated to sell the Ledge Site
to MHNHS for $2 million. After the community planning process was complete,
MHNHS released a request for proposal (RFP) for the project.
One of the architects that had participated in the community planning process was
interested in responding to the RFP, and contacted NDC as a partner. At the time, NDC 's
portfolio was concentrated in the Boston suburbs and the firm's management was
interested in expanding the portfolio into "the city." The proximity to the Longwood
Medical area attracted NDC to the One Brigham Circle project, but the developer's
recognized that "the inherent risk would be to find a user" to anchor the retail component
of the project. While there were several developers that responded to the RFP, NDC was
the only one that largely accepted the development plan that the community produced.
NDC recommended the inclusion of the Calumet site, a adjoining parcel that was not
owned by Harvard but fronted on Brigham Circle. MHNHS and NDC negotiated a
partnership agreement such that their respective partnership interests would be taken
down on a pro rata basis. Thus, the interests of the partners would be aligned during the
decision-making process for adding any new partner.
NDC then went to the market to find an equity source. The primary focus was to find a
capital source that could provide the equity and the debt to finance the project. NDC had
no personal equity in the deal. The New Boston Fund offered "one-stop" shopping for the
project. The New Boston Fund is a Boston-based regional real estate investment and
development firm owned by the Rappaport family. The New Boston Fund was willing to
provide the initial commitment to fund the predevelopment costs, fund the balance of the
equity for the project during the development phase, and place the debt. For The New
Boston Fund, the One Brigham Circle represented a $49 million project in the heart of
Boston that would enhance their opportunistic portfolio and fit well within its infill
development strategy.
The land costs for the project were approximately $4 million. The 9.5 acres of land that
consisted of the Ledge Site was prenegotiated at $2 million, with no escalation in price as
the development process continued over a ten-year period. The 10,000 square feet that
comprised the Calumet Site was also priced at about $2 million, which was negotiated
with the Siegel family. The buyout of the existing leases cost an estimated $1 million.
Strategies to Reduce Liability
In order to mitigate liability, NDC acquired pollution legal liability insurance (PLL).
NDC was able to procure long-term coverage with the right to renew. PLL products were
readily available and competitively priced. Since One Brigham Circle project was a less
than $1 million project, NDC did not pursue cost cap insurance. Such a policy was
deemed too expensive for the size of the project and extent of the remediation.
Design7
Brigham Circle has historically functioned as the gateway to Mission Hill. The design for
the One Brigham Circle project sought to recognize that role by creating a "landmark"
structure that would visibly identify its importance as a major commercial node. The two
7 The source for this section was a One Brigham Circle brochure provided by NDC Associates.
main buildings are joined by a "Grand Stairway" that connects to a public plaza that
fronts on Brigham Circle, the Lower Village Square. Building heights, setbacks and
materials were incorporated into the project's design to facilitate blending with the
existing neighborhood context.
Tremont Street, Mission Hill's traditional "Main Street," was lined with glass retail
storefronts. In order to promote the vitality of the retail sections, architectural metal
awnings and banners were incorporated into the building fagade. Red brick, enhanced
with precast concrete details, predominates the second and third floors. The proportions
of the punched window openings were designed to be complementary to that of other
buildings in the vicinity. Glass predominates the fourth floor of the building along
Tremont Street, which is set back, in order to reduce the visual impact of the building.
The pedestrian orientation of the project is emphasized by the verticality of the first three
levels of the building. One Brigham Circle blends in with the three-story row house
architecture that characterizes the Mission Hill neighborhood. The project has 30-ft
column bays, which are "accentuated on the fagade together with angled bays" that give
the fagade a "row house rhythm."
Market Acceptance
During the early- to mid-i 990s, when NDC began searching for a tenant, the targets were
financial firms. The healthcare industry was struggling with the implications of the
healthcare policy changes that had been proposed under the Clinton Administration. The
healthcare industry seemed to be moving more towards contraction than expansion. In
contrast, the financial services industry was experiencing strong growth. However, the
"Putnam's and Fidelity's" of the Boston area were not considering infill locations, and a
neighborhood like Mission Hill was considered "iffy" due to the stigma associated with
the Stuart murder and perceptions of high crime rates associated with public housing.
However, by the late 1990s, the healthcare industry had rebounded and many of the
institutions in the Longwood Medical area were experiencing substantial growth in their
research coffers. From 1997 to 2001, the Children's Hospital, one of the 21 institutions in
Longwood, had experienced a 50 percent increase in its research funding, to $100 million
annually (Kowalezyk, 2001). The leasing strategy began to target the tenant base that was
most complementary to the project, medical institutions. By 1999, a letter of intent had
been signed with Partners Healthcare Systems, Inc. for the office space. Partners
HealthCare Systems, Inc. had signed on for all of the 116,500 square feet of office space
at the site in mid-2000. It took about three to four years to find a tenant to the project that
would enable the developers to attract capital. The signing of the Partners lease was
critical to the viability of the project.
Partners took occupancy of the office component of the project during the spring. NDC
and The New Boston Fund were able to negotiate long-term leases with major tenants for
large retail spaces in the project. Stop & Shop, a national grocery chain, signed a 20-year
lease for a 38,000 square foot tri-level store. Walgreens, a national drugstore chain,
signed a 40-year, 13,000-square foot lease for a two level store. The development will
also include two bank branches, a 4,300 Citizens Bank branch and 3,400 Fleet Bank
branch. By March 2003, the One Brigham Circle project was more than 90 percent pre-
leased.
Brigham Circle Project Contact:
Catherine Barba
Harvard Medical School
Office of the Executive Dean for Administration
John Dragat
Senior Vice President
NDC Development Associates
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Chapter VII: Analysis
The case studies included in this thesis clearly demonstrate the importance of strong real
estate fundamentals for success in brownfield redevelopment. Both transactions occurred
in urban core markets where there was pent-up demand for real estate redevelopment due
to a historic lack of private investment in real estate within the community. In the
Brigham Circle case, redevelopment of the brownfield site was primarily hindered by
strained relations between the institutional owner of the land and the community, a
general lack of equity investor interest in the largely low-income and minority
neighborhood that had negative associations with crime, and an area in which
institutional landowners had allowed property conditions to deteriorate. In the Bay Street
case, the extensive environmental contamination associated with the site, as well as
negative perceptions of struggling, low-income and minority communities in the urban
core, contributed to the lack of investor interest in redeveloping the site.
However, the market fundamentals were strong in both cases. There was pent up demand
for office space fueled primarily by the medical and educational institutions that
dominated the area on the other side of Huntington Avenue. In addition, there was unmet
demand for retail uses that catered not only to the existing residential base but also to the
large office and medical facility population. As a mixed-use project, the office
component could act as an anchor to the retail uses, thus ensuring an institutional
presence that would draw customer traffic to the retail area and serve to incorporate the
Brigham Circle project within the broader framework of medical institutions in the area.
The Bay Street project was driven by retail fundamentals that existed in the market: an
underserved residential community and broader market where retail was under-
represented. In both cases, the real estate uses were chosen according to existing demand
trends and based on prudent market analysis that demonstrated the viability of such uses
based on demographic and competitive trends.
Tools to mitigate environmental risk varied across the cases, depending on the extent and
timing associated with the remediation. The Bay Street site had experienced substantial
environmental contamination over a number of years due to its historic accommodation
of heavy industrial and manufacturing facilities. The extent of the contamination, and the
regulatory framework that existed at the time, resulted in forcing the community, in the
form of the city ERA, to take the lead in the predevelopment remediation of the property.
The city of Emeryville took on the responsibility of assembling the parcels, negotiating
with the state environmental authorities regarding the remediation standards and liability
issues, funding the remediation, and seeking remuneration from previous owners. This, in
addition to capping the remediation costs for the new private owners, resulted in relief of
a substantial burden of the financial and liability risk associated with the Bay Street
project, thus enabling an institutional "deep pocket" investor like CalPERS to take an
equity stake in the project.
The One Brigham Circle project was lower on the environmental risk scale, involving
contamination associated with the past dry cleaning use onsite. Since the timing and
extent of the necessary remediation was relatively easy to assess, the private developer,
which accessed institutional capital through an opportunity fund, was willing to take on
the environmental risks associated with the remediation by acquiring an insurance policy
appropriate to the site.
Community involvement was critical to redevelopment success in both cases, and the
final projects represented a broad community vision for the site. As discussed above, the
willingness of the city of Emeryville to take on, and limit, the costs associated with the
remediation of the Bay Street site was a key component of the project's ability to access
institutional capital. The city had identified the Bay Street Site as a prime location for
retail use within the community. In the case of the One Brigham Circle project, the
development reflected a multi-year effort to create a plan that reflected the needs of the
residential community and the broader Mission Hill community that worked in the
medical and education institutions located there. Previous efforts by Harvard to redevelop
the site had failed due to the lack of community involvement in developing the plans.
Despite the existence of strong market fundamentals supporting redevelopment to more
productive use, both projects would not have occurred if not for the active engagement of
the community in helping to facilitate the process.
The scale of the two projects, and the difference in the investment structure underscores
the diversity of structures available for institutional investment in brownfields in the
urban core. Institutional investment in the One Brigham Circle project came through the
opportunity fund investment structure, which allows institutional investors to have an
allocation to opportunistic real estate equity investment in multiple properties. The
opportunity fund structure accommodates institutional investors of various sizes; such
that smaller pension plans are able to diversify their real estate holdings. In marked
contrast, the Bay Street project represents the type of niche strategy that large
institutional investors - in this case, the largest pension plan in the country - can pursue
by leveraging their power within the market and in house capacity. CalPERS has
excellent access to real estate expertise, including in-house staff and strategic
partnerships, which enables the plan to pursue smaller, focused strategy efforts that
further enhance the diversification of its real estate portfolio. Through its equity joint
venture partnership, with MacFarlane Partners, California Urban Investment Partners,
CalPERS is able to pursue a regionally focused strategy targeting urban neighborhoods in
major metropolitan areas. The portfolio allocation to CUIP is $200 million, of which $75
million had been placed by August of 2002 (CalPERS, 2002).
The target returns on the equity investments in both One Brigham Circle and the Bay
Street project are north of 15%, and perceived to be attractive even after adjusting for the
level of risk associated with the projects (Hoeffel and Dragat, 2003). These returns reflect
expected returns on the equity investment in the projects. Since the projects are relatively
new, it remains to be seen whether the projects will deliver the expected returns over the
investment hold period. However, despite weakness in the general economy, both
projects demonstrated significant market strength by achieving high leasing levels. One
Brigham Circle was over 90% leased for the entire mixed-use project as of March 2003,
and the retail component of Bay Street was over 80% leased as of June 2003. The
developers expressed optimism regarding their expectations of achieving the target
returns.
Chapter VIII: Conclusions
The case studies included in this thesis did not represent a scientific sample of the scale,
geographic range, and economic benefits of institutional investment in brownfields in
urban core locations. Rather, the inclusion of the case studies was based on available
information. While one must be cautious in drawing conclusions based on such a small
sample, it is worthwhile to consider what the implications may be for future trends in
institutional investment in brownfields in urban core communities. Furthermore, such
trends may have important implications for urban communities of color that are burdened
with brownfield sites.
The change in the regulatory framework may contribute to more institutional activity in
equity participation in brownfield developments. The recent nod from the federal
government signals a substantial break from the stance that the federal government took
when CERCLA was enacted. This demonstrates interest on the part of the federal
government to help facilitate redevelopment efforts that will contribute to the cleanup of
environmentally contaminated sites and the return of underutilized or abandoned sites to
productive use. The recent federal legislation has empowered state agencies to help
facilitate brownfield redevelopment in accordance with appropriate standards, which in
turn has enhanced their postion to foster brownfield redevelopment. The change from a
primarily adversarial stance towards "innocent" buyers to more of a partnership stance
has contributed to a more favorable context for institutional equity investment in viable
brownfield projects.
The availability and competitive pricing of risk transfer tools over the last decade have
contributed to a broadening of the brownfield investor base (Meyer, 2003). Current
market conditions indicate that there is less availability of cost cap insurance policies, and
that such products are more expensive than they had been during the late 1990s, while
pollution liability policies continue to be competitively priced (Meyer, 2003). The
availability and pricing of environmental insurance products overall is significantly
improved versus ten years ago, and has gone far towards diversifying the pool of
investors, including institutional investors such as pension plans and university
endowments, that are willing to pursue real estate projects that involve contaminated land
(Meyer, 2003). The availability of pollution liability insurance at a competitive price
enabled the equity partners in the case studies to achieve an acceptable degree of comfort
with the liability and financial risk associated with their respective brownfield projects.
Recent increases in the general tolerance levels for environmental risk amongst
institutional investors bodes well for urban core communities burdened with
environmentally contaminated property. The zero tolerance policies that dominated
institutional real estate portfolios during the 1980s no longer prevail amongst major
pension plan investors. Political pressures associated with increasing public awareness of
the negative impacts of suburban sprawl and the benefits of smart growth policies may
lead to more focus on opportunities for redevelopment in urban infill locations,
particularly amongst high profile institutional investors. The broadening of the investor
base for brownfield projects has resulted in a wider range of investment vehicle options,
from equity joint venture partnerships to opportunity funds, for small and large
organizations. Over time, brownfields should become more of an integrated part of the
real estate investment universe, and part of the full range of real estate equity investment
opportunities along the risk spectrum.
If that happens, many communities of color in the urban core that have been historically
overlooked for private real estate investment should be well positioned to benefit from
the renewed attention. Due to a host of factors, many communities of color in the urban
core have held a disproportionate share of the country's environmentally contaminated
land, and have suffered from the lack of private real estate investment, particularly
amongst institutional investors, who have the capital to fund the equity costs associated
with large-scale projects. In addition, there has been a significant increase in the pipeline
of niche joint venture partners who have demonstrated particular expertise in developing
real estate in ethnically diverse communities and underserved urban markets. The rise in
such partners may go far towards getting institutional investors comfortable with
investing in markets in which the demographic profile differs significantly from the
profiles of the suburban markets that dominated their portfolios in years past. Both of the
case studies included in this thesis involved regional players, NDC Associates and
MacFarlane Partners, that were able to appropriately analyze the markets under
consideration and navigate the local community approval process. The fact that both of
the communities were areas where a substantial portion of the population were people of
color and low-income residents attests to the fact that real estate projects in urban core
communities of color can be economically viable and offer attractive risk-adjusted
returns.
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